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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V.
COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance reform as an issue has been around for over a
century. Campaign finance reform as policy has taken on many
different guises. However, campaign finance reform as a solution to
a problem has never materialized. Anyone familiar with today's
political climate should be convinced of this truth because the debate
over campaign finance reform is heated and very well publicized. On
the national level, Senator John McCain is the fiery, straight-talking,
standard bearer for reform. His proposal, popularly known as McCain-
Feingold, was debated numerous times over the past several years, and
just recently, Congress passed the bill, and President Bush signed it
into law.' However, the debate is not exclusively a national one. In
South Carolina, reform rhetoric has grown as the 2002 gubernatorial
election approaches. Governor Jim Hodges created an advisory
commission to study state campaign finance laws and charged the
commission to issue a report as well as proposals to improve the
system.2 The Report of the Governor's Task Force on Campaign
Finance Reform3 was submitted in April 2001, but the Governor and
the Legislature have not yet acted upon its recommendations.
The most important theater for campaign finance reform debate
has been the United States Supreme Court. Since the early 1970's, our
court system has been wrestling with the constitutional questions that
are intertwined with campaign finance reform.4 The First Amendment
1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002).
2. S.C. Exec. Order No. 2000-29, at http://www.state.sc.us/governor/2000-
29.html (Nov. 16, 2000).
3. Report of the Governor's Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform, South Carolina
Votersfor Cean Elections, at ht(pA9ww.scvotersfocleanelections.com/govfiflheporthun (Apr. 19,
2001).
4. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the seminal case dealing with the
constitutionality of campaign finance reform. See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377 (2000) (reversing a decision of the Eighth Circuit that held a Missouri
statute limiting contributions to candidates for state office to be unconstitutional under
the First Amendment); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) (reversing a decision ofthe Sixth Circuit that held a Michigan statute prohibiting
1
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to the United States Constitution, which guarantees the freedoms of
speech and association to all citizens, has served as a gatekeeper to the
legislative efforts.' For example, those who believe that the campaign
process is corrupt may desire a flexible interpretation of the First
Amendment in order to clear the path for regulations that would
change the process. Others see a prohibition in the First Amendment
as the only "regulation" that needs enforcing to achieve effective
reform of our campaign finance system.6
The latest case to be decided by the Supreme Court regarding
campaign finance reform is FederalElection Commission v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado Republican 11).'
The decision, which upholds the constitutionality of restrictions on "a
party's coordinated expenditures,"' was well received by reformists
and by Sen. McCain who said, "[c]learly, this decision demonstrates
that McCain-Feingold restrictions on campaign contributions are
constitutional."9 This statement will certainly be tested over the next
few years, as challenges to the legislation will be heard in federal
courts across the country. Whether McCain is correct in his analysis
will depend on several variables-the most crucial of which is the
make-up of the Court. Colorado Republican II was a 5-4 decision
featuring a sharp philosophical divide and could be one new Justice
away from being overruled. Therefore, rather than focusing entirely
on the application of the Colorado Republican II holding to McCain-
corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in
support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state office to be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment as applied to a non-profit corporation);
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (affirming a
decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that held a federal statute making
it a criminal offense for independent political committees to expend more than $1000
to aid a presidential candidate receiving public financing for his general election
campaign to be unconstitutional on its face under the First Amendment); Brown v.
Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (affirming a decision
from the Southern District of Ohio that held an Ohio statute requiring every political
party to report names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of
campaign disbursements to be unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers
Party).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
6. See BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM 225-27 (2001) (concluding that the solution to perceived campaign corruption
is to heed the strict First Amendment prohibition that "Congress shall make no
law .... " to "keep[] government out of the electoral arena" and allow for "a full
interplay of political ideas").
7. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
8. Id. at 465.
9. Charles Lane, Court Backs Limits on Campaign Spending; Justices Cite Need
to Curb 'Hard Money' Contributions, WASH. POST, June 26, 2001, at A8.
2
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Feingold, this Note will consider the Court's reasoning and balancing
of the government's interest in preventing corruption against the
Constitution's restrictive language. Though directly impacting only
federal law, the resolution of this balancing in the area of campaign
finance will also be profoundly felt in the halls of state government.
As a result, the precedents set in the federal system today will
inevitably shape reforms here in South Carolina.
Part II of this Note discusses the relevant history of campaign
finance reform, including statutes and cases that have preceded the
Colorado Republican II decision. Part III will explain the facts of
Colorado Republican II, its fascinating procedural history, and the
holding. Part IV will apply the decision to the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, which is Congress's adoption of the McCain-
Feingold Bill, to consider the constitutionality of its measures. Part V
will analyze the reasoning of the Court and argue for de-emphasizing
regulatory measures that violate the spirit of the First Amendment and
argue for promoting honest disclosures by political actors. Part VI will
conclude by commenting on proposed reforms of South Carolina's
campaign finance laws.
II. HISTORY
Campaign finance legislation was first initiated by Progressives
almost one hundred years ago,"0 and in 1925, the established rules
were codified and expanded in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act."
Campaign contributions and expenditures by corporations, national
banks, and labor organizations to federal campaigns were forbidden, 2
disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures was required,
and spending limits on campaign contributions and expenditures were
established.' 3 However, the act lacked any meaningful bite, was
defenseless against creative-maneuvering, and resulted in no
prosecutions during its fifty-one-year life. 4
Developing during this time was a concern that money was
buying influence in the government."5 While one person equaled one
vote, critics of the system believed that larger donations equaled a
louder voice in the discussion and direction of public policy.'6 "Quid
10. See LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE
PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS I1 (1996).
11. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, § 301, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed
1976).
12. Id. § 313.
13. Id. at 1071-73.
14. See SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 10, at 12.
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pro quo agreements, . . . undue influence on an officerholder's[sic]
judgment, and the appearance of such influence"' 7 were believed to be
direct results of big money in politics. In 1971, Congress responded
by passing the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). 8 FECA's
primary mechanism to level the political playing field was to have
more stringent disclosure requirements. 9 The desired result of these
requirements was to easily spot quid pro quo agreements upon
matching the candidate's money sources with his political agenda.2"
Corruption would be discouraged and punished.
Amendments to FECA were passed in 1974 after the Watergate
scandal.2 Watergate provided reformers the perfect illustration of
corruption; therefore, it gave the support necessary to increase the
regulation of federal campaign practices.2 The amendments
established public financing for presidential races and new limits on
contributions and spending.23 The first addition to FECA now exists
on a taxpayer's Form 1040. There is a voluntary check-off box that
diverts $3.00 of the taxes owed to a pool of money, which is
distributed to candidates as matching funds in exchange for a
candidate's promise to limit his spending.24 The second addition
limited contributions so that a person may only contribute up to $1000
for candidates, $20,000 for political parties, and $5000 for political
action committees (PACs)." The third addition limited spending for
House races to $75,000 and for Senate races to $250,000, which could
increase depending on a state's population.26 The spending limits
included both "direct candidate spending and "spending 'relative to a
clearly identified candidate."' 27
An unlikely coalition of political players from all comers of the
political spectrum, including conservative Senator James Buckley and
the American Civil Liberties Union, immediately challenged these
21new provisions in court. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
this challenge in Buckley v. Valeo.29 The Court found that FECA's
limits on contributions and expenditures impinged on the First
17. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (defining "corruption").
18. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994).
19. See id. § 434.
20. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 31.
21. Id. at 32.
22. Id. at 31-32.
23. Id. at 32.
24. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6096, 9003 (1994).
25. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (1994).
26. SMITH, supra note 6, at 33.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 34.
29. 424 U.S. 1.
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss1/8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Amendment right to free speech.3" However, the prevention of the
"actuality and appearance" of corruption was found to be a sufficient
federal government interest to justify this impingement in regard to
contribution limits.3 The Court determined that large contributions
have the potential to lead to quid pro quo agreements, so contribution
limits were justified.32 In regard to limits on expenditures, the Court
found they imposed "direct and substantial restraints" on core First
Amendment rights of political speech and expression.33 Consequently,
it held such limits to be unconstitutional.34 However, this holding had
the effect of allowing wealthy candidates to spend freely from their
own pockets and allowing independent groups and individuals to
spend money in support of or against a candidate, so long as no
direction came from the candidate favored by such spending.35
In 1979, Congress made the final alteration to FECA. In an effort
to bolster grassroots political activity (or party-building), Congress
amended FECA
to allow parties to spend unlimited sums of money
raised pursuant to the federal rules for these
grassroot activities, without counting such
expenditures as "contributions" to federal
candidates. These funds, raised for purposes other
than the express advocacy of the election or defeat
of candidates for federal office, soon became known
as "soft money. '"36
If soft money is successfully banned, the constitutionality of such a
ban will certainly become a matter for the federal court system. The
ultimate result will rest upon the statutory language of FECA and the
judicial interpretations, beginning with Buckley, of that language.
The only expenditure provision of FECA that survived the strict
scrutiny of the Buckley Court was the provision popularly known as
the Party Expenditure Provision.37 This provision prohibits parties
30. Id. at 22-23.
31. Id. at 26.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 39.
34. Id. at51, 54, 58-59.
35. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 10, at 15.
36. SMITH, supra note 6, at 35.
37. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3). The provision provides:
The national committee of a political party, or a State committee
of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a
State committee, may not make any expenditure in connection
with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal
office in a State who is affiliated with such party which
2002]
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from spending money on behalf of candidates for federal office in
excess of the statutory limit.3 8 As the Court ruled in Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n
(Colorado Republican 1), it is unconstitutional to restrict independent
expenditures, which are those made free from any consultation or
control of a candidate, his committee or agents. 9 However, before
Colorado Republican I, political parties were thought to be incapable
of making independent expenditures.4'
III. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. COLORADO REPUBLICAN
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
A. Facts
The United States Supreme Court's June 25, 2001 decision of
Colorado Republican IP' put to rest a case that arose more than fifteen
years ago. The decision made in the case represents the Court's only
review of the Party Expenditure Provision.4 2 The facts of the case
begin in January 1986 when Democratic Congressman Timothy Wirth
announced his run for the open Senate seat to be filled in that
November's general election.43 Three months later, before selecting its
own candidate, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee bought radio advertisements attacking Congressman
Wirth.' The ad campaign prompted a complaint from the Colorado
Democratic Party to the Federal Election Committee (FEC).45 The
Democratic Party argued that the purchase of radio time was an
"expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a
exceeds-
(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of
Senator, or of Representative from a State which is
entitled to only one Representative, the greater of-
(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age
population of the State (as certified under
subsection (e) of this section); or
(ii) $20,000; and
(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the
office of Representative, Delegate, or Resident
Commissioner in any other State, $10,000.
38. Id.
39. 518 U.S. 604, 610(1996).
40. See Coordinated Party Expenditures, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,961 (Aug. 7, 1996) (to
amend 11 C.F.R. pt. 110.7).
41. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
42. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).
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candidate for Federal office," which caused the Republican Party to
exceed the Party Expenditure Provision limits."
B. Procedural History
1. Colorado Republican I
The FEC agreed with the Democratic Party and filed a complaint
against the Colorado Republican Party.47 In its defense, the
Republican Party argued that the Party Expenditure Provision's
expenditure limitation violated the First Amendment." The U.S.
District Court held that the provision did not cover the expenditures
at issue and entered summary judgment for the Republican Party.49 On
appeal, the FEC argued for a broader interpretation of the statute that
would apply "the limits to advertisements containing an
'electioneering message' about a 'clearly identified candidate,"' which
would cover the expenditure while satisfying the Constitution. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, finding the Party
Expenditure Provision constitutional and applicable." The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Party Expenditure
Provision violated the First Amendment as applied to the Republican
Party's particular expenditure.52 The Court held that the spending
limits set by the Federal Election Campaign Act were unconstitutional
as applied to the Colorado Republican Party's independent
expenditures in connection with the senatorial campaign."
Significantly, the case was remanded for consideration of the
Republican Party's secondary claim that all limits on expenditures by
a political party in connection with congressional campaigns are
facially unconstitutional and, thus, unenforceable even as to spending
coordinated with a candidate.54
46. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)).
47. Colorado Republican !, 518 U.S. at 612-13.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 613.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Colorado Republican , 518 U.S. at 613.
54. Id. at 625-26.
2002]
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2. Colorado Republican II: United States District Court,
District of Colorado
The Supreme Court remanded the Republican Party's
counterclaim to the district court in Colorado." The counterclaim was
a constitutional challenge to the Party Expenditure Provision, which
"places limits on the amount of money which committees of political
parties may expend 'in connection with the general election campaign
of candidates for Federal offices."' 56 In response, the FEC argued that
"the Party Expenditure Provision serves a compelling Government
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest... [and] is not
unconstitutionally vague.""7 Contributions are limited by 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a), so the FEC reasoned that, since coordinated expenditures
are considered contributions, the Party Expenditure Provision is
valid.58 However, the district court noted that regulation of
contributions have been allowed only because "the regulations
imposed a 'marginal restriction' on the contributor's First Amendment
rights."59 In the case of political parties, the party's speech cannot be
separated from speech on the candidate's behalf without constraining
the party from advocating its most essential positions and from
pursuing its most basic goals."
The court reasoned that "a political party functions to promote
political ideas and policy objectives over time and through elected
officials."'" Therefore, the district court held that party spending
coordinated with a candidate is basically the same as expenditures by
the candidate or his campaign.62 Since the Supreme Court's decision
in Buckley prohibits the regulation of expenditures, the district court
ruled that the Party Expenditure Provision cannot regulate party
coordinated expenditures without violating a party's First Amendment
rights.
63
The FEC also argued that the Party Expenditure Provision's
limitation of party coordinated expenditures is necessary to avoid
corruption or the appearance thereof.64 The FEC maintained that a
party with unlimited ability to spend on behalf of a candidate would
55. Fed. Election Comm'n. v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41
F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999).
56. Id. at 1198.
57. Id. at 1204.
58. Id. at 1208.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1210.
61. Colorado Republican, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
62. Id. at 1213.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1210-11.
8
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have a corrupting effect because a party could pressure a candidate to,
in effect, toe the party line.65 However, the district court found no
corruption, citing Buckley for the proposition that corruption is related
to "large individual financial contributions."66 The court reasoned that
hard money contributions, those raised in accordance with FECA
limits and the only money which parties may spend on behalf of
candidates for federal election, come from many individuals who
donate in small amounts.67 While the FEC urged the court to consider
the cumulative impact of hard and soft money contributions from one
entity, the court held that no evidence suggested that soft money is
used for coordinated expenditures.68 Since "[t]he FECA reporting
requirements which indicate the sources and the amount of
contributions are designed to insure that campaign finance is
scrutinized," the district court rejected the FEC argument that
coordinated expenditures must be limited.69
3. Colorado Republican II: United States Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit
To reach its decision, the Tenth Circuit analyzed three of the
FEC's arguments on how coordinated spending by parties corrupts or
appears to corrupt the electoral system.7" The first argument was that
contributors could corrupt the process through their influence over a
party.71 The FEC attempted to show how soft money promotes the
purchasing of power.72 However, the circuit court dismissed the
argument because the FECA regulates only hard money, and hard
money is used to expressly advocate the election or defeat of federal
candidates.73 Additionally, no evidence was presented that suggests
that parties have illegally utilized soft money donations for hard
money spending.74
The FEC's second argument was that unethical party officials
could use a party's coordinated spending authority to apply improper
pressure upon its own candidates.75 The circuit court rejected the
notion that political parties can corrupt the electoral process by
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1212.
67. Colorado Republican, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
68. Id. at 1211.
69. Id. at 1212-13.
70. Fed. Election Comm'n. v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213
F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000).




75. Id. at 1230.
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influencing their candidates' positions.76 It reasoned that political
parties represent broad-based coalitions of interest (unlike PACs
which represent one interest) and that there was nothing inherently
ruinous in such a coalition shaping the views of its candidates.77 The
court suggested that "the solution to pollution is dilution.
78
The FEC's third argument was that the Party Expenditure
Provision must be upheld to prevent evasion of FECA's other
contribution limits.79 The fear is that if coordinated expenditure limits
are lifted, individuals may circumvent the contribution limit by giving
to a party with the understanding that those funds are to be earmarked
for use by a specific candidate.80 This argument was also rejected
because, under FECA, earmarked contributions are treated as
contributions to a specific candidate, and vigilant enforcement of that
provision is the proper means to prevent such maneuvering.81
However, in dissent, Chief Judge Seymour stated that the majority
had improperly substituted its judgment for that of Congress's on how
best to balance the need to promote the role of political parties and the
need to combat its potential for corruption.82 According to the dissent,
the FEC "amply supported its argument that limits on coordinated
expenditures by political parties serve the public interest in preventing
both corruption and the appearance of corruption by limiting the
leverage parties possess to pay off the political debts owed to large
contributors."83 Common sense and experience justify the view that
candidates or elected officials will promote policies favorable to large
contributors that they may not otherwise have promoted.84 Finally, the
judge opined that "FECA has played a major role in the curtailment
of abuses ... [and] [e]liminating an integral part of the Act would
allow those abuses to flourish once again."85
4. Colorado Republican H: United States Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in order
to resolve the constitutionality of the Party Expenditure Provision's
limitation on coordinated expenditures by political parties.86 The result
76. Colorado Republican, 213 F.3d at 1230-31.




81. Id. at 1232.
82. Colorado Republican, 213 F.3d at 1233 (Seymour, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1244.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. 431, 439-40 (2001).
10
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was a narrow 5-4 decision that reversed the lower courts and rejected
the challenge to limits on parties' coordinated expenditures. Justice
Souter penned the majority decision and was joined by Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor and Stevens. Justice Thomas dissented
and was joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia and by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in part.
The majority laid the groundwork for its decision by recalling the
1976 seminal opinion of Buckley v. Valeo, 7 the first case to challenge
FECA. 8 The most important distinction arising from that case was
that made between "contributions" and "expenditures."89 The Buckley
Court held that it was generally constitutional to limit contributions to
a candidate's election campaign, but it was not constitutional to limit
election expenditures.90 The Court noted that this distinction has been
respected by the ensuing line of cases9 and that the Court had
"routinely struck down limitations on independent expenditures by
candidates, other individuals, and groups, . . . while repeatedly
upholding contribution limits."92 The Court also made it clear that
expenditures coordinated with a candidate are considered
contributions.93 Thus, the Court had to decide whether a party is in a
different position from other political speakers so as to require a
generally higher standard of scrutiny before its coordinated spending
can be limited.94
To reach its decision, the majority considered whether limiting
coordinated spending would impose a unique burden on parties and
whether a party's coordinated spending would raise the same risk of
corruption as when others spend in coordination with a candidate.9"
The majority concluded that no unique burden is imposed upon a party
by these limitations96 and that the likelihood of corruption would
increase with unlimited, party-coordinated expenditures.9 7
The Court was swayed by evidence that suggested Congress's
coordinated spending limits had not frustrated the ability of parties to
exercise their First Amendment rights to support their candidates.9"
The Court suggested that a conclusion to the contrary would mean that
"for almost three decades political parties have not been functional or
87. 424 U.S. 1.





93. Colorado Republican H1, 533 U.S. at 438.
94. Id. at 445.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 455.
97. Id. at 464-65.
98. Id. at 449-50.
2002]
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have been functioning in systemic violation of the law."99 The Court
cited with approval commentary and prior case law, which suggests
that parties serve as agents for spending on behalf of those who want
obligated officeholders.' This idea supported the notion that limits
on parties' coordinated spending should be viewed "through the same
lens applied to such spending by donors, like PACs, that can use
parties as conduits for contributions meant to place candidates under
obligation."'' Furthermore, the Court stated that parties are prime
targets for exploitation for corrupt purposes, because they are
"efficient in generating large sums to spend and in pinpointing
effective ways to spend them."'0 2
The majority is further convinced by the FEC's evidence of the
"tallying" system, which helps to "connect donors to candidates
through the accommodation of a [political] party" once that donor can
no longer make direct contributions to the candidate.0 3 Additionally,
while some contributions are small, the majority is convinced that
contributions of up to $20,000 to a party can earn that donor special
meetings and receptions whereby they can get their points across to a
candidate or official.' In fear that such activity would only increase
with unlimited coordinated expenditures, the Court held that
coordinated spending leads to corruption to the same degree as direct
contributions.'05 Therefore, the Court held that the Party Expenditure
Provision, which limits a party's coordinated spending, serves a
substantial government interest and is just as constitutional as
statutory limits on contributions.'0 6
The dissent, on the other hand, concluded that the Party
Expenditure Provision "sweeps too broadly, interferes with the party-
candidate relationship, and has not been proved necessary to combat
corruption."107 Justice Thomas stated that the majority's conclusions
that coordinated expenditures are no different from contributions and
that political parties are no different from individuals and political
committees are both flawed.' 8 He reasoned that political parties and
their candidates are "inextricably intertwined," that "a party's public
image is largely defined by what its candidates say and do," and that
"it would be impractical and imprudent.., for a party to support its
99. Colorado Republican 11, 533 U.S. at 449.
100. See id. at 450-52.
101. Id. at 452.
102. Id. at 453.
103. Id. at 458-59.
104. Id. at 461.
105. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 464-65.
106. Id. at 465.
107. Id. at 465 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 467.
12
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own candidates without some form of 'cooperation' or
'consultation." 0 9
The dissent maintained that the Party Expenditure Provision is
unconstitutional because there is insufficient evidence to show that
coordinated expenditures by parties give rise to corruption and
because "the restriction is not 'closely drawn' to curb this
corruption.""' Justice Thomas suggested alternatives that he would
find constitutional for addressing the. government interest in curbing
corruption."' First, simple enforcement of bribery laws, disclosure
laws, and the earmarking rule" 2 would be precise responses to the
Court's circumvention concerns." 3 Additionally, Justice Thomas
suggested that, since the majority believes that a $20,000 donation is
enough to corrupt a candidate, the constitutional solution should be to
lower the contribution cap to political parties rather than limiting what
the party can spend." 4 In summary, Justice Thomas feels that "it
makes no sense to contravene a political party's core First Amendment
rights because of what a third party might unlawfully try to do.""' 5
IV. Is MCCAIN-FEINGOLD CONSTITUTIONAL?
For those who support McCain-Feingold as the solution to a
corrupt election system, the Court's decision in Colorado Republican
II was welcome news. John McCain himself commented, "[c]learly,
this decision demonstrates that McCain-Feingold restrictions on
campaign contributions are constitutional, [and] [ojur opponents will
have to find some other excuse not to enact laws to restore Americans'
confidence in our political system.""' 6 Common Cause, a reform
organization that supported the bill, released a statement saying, "[t]he
109. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 474.
111. Colorado Republican 11, 533 U.S. at 481.
112. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (1994) which provides:
For purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all
contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on
behalfof a particular candidate, including contributions which are
in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an
intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as
contributions from such person to such candidate. The
intermediary or conduit shall report the original source and the
intended recipient of such contribution to the Commission and to
the intended recipient.
113. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 481.
114. Id. at 482.
115. Id.
116. Lane, supra note 9, at A8.
20021
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same reasoning the court used to sustain the party limits today will
also sustain a ban on soft money......
Opponents of McCain-Feingold had a different take on the
decision. Jan Baran, who represented the Republican Party in the case
said, "[t]his case will be used to support the proposition that
government can regulate campaign contributions to a certain extent,
[but] .. . [t]his case is not carte blanche for regulating politics.' l.
Craig Engle, former general counsel to the National Republican
Senatorial Committee, said, "[t]hroughout the majority opinion, it is
pretty clear that party committees cannot be treated differently than
other political actors ... [so] [i]f the court won't give parties special
permission [to spend in coordination with a candidate without limits],
then it's unlikely the court will give parties special prohibitions." ' 9 In
addition, James Bopp, Jr., general counsel of the James Madison
Center for Free Speech, said, "[t]he high court's opinion confirms that
when parties act independently from candidates or pursue activities
that are not contributions to candidates, they may not constitutionally
be limited, much less be subjected to an outright ban as in McCain-
Feingold."' 20
The primary goal of McCain-Feingold is to ban soft money,
which is money given by corporations and other large donors for
party-building and electioneering communications and is currently
unregulated by FECA.'2 ' The reasoning of Colorado Republican H1,
that unlimited expenditures by a party in coordination with a candidate
leads to corruption,'22 can easily be transferred to the soft money
setting. If the Justices feel that unlimited soft money contributions
gamer a donor direct access to candidates and elected officials, then
a ban on such money would be constitutional because access at least
leads to the appearance of undue influence by a donor. This access is
gained, theoretically, through the soft money loophole, as corporations
are not currently allowed to make direct contributions to a candidate
or hard money contributions to a party,'23 and individuals are limited
in what they can give to a candidate or party.24
117. Robert S. Greenberger & Tom Hamburger, High Court Upholds Limits on
Party Spending, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2001, at A14.
118. Id.
119. Lane, supra note 9.
120. Id.
12 1. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101,
116 Stat. 81, 82-86 (2002).
122. See Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. 431, 464-65 (2001).
123. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994).
124. See id. § 441 a(a).
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As long as the law views parties as agents for spending on behalf
of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders," 5 regulations
aimed at such activity by parties will survive the current application
of strict scrutiny. However, after the Court's decision in Colorado
Republican II, it remains clear that a party's expenditures "truly
independent" of its candidate cannot be limited without violating a
First Amendment right to free speech.2 6 With this precedent, a ban on
money given in such a manner would not appear constitutional.
However, one must wonder what the Court means when it says
"truly independent." When the Colorado Republican Party spent its
money in 1986, they did not have a candidate, and, therefore,
coordination was not at all possible. If truly independent expenditures
means spending by a party when there is no party candidate, then truly
independent expenditures would be possible only in a time span
between the general election and the next primary. Spending during
a general campaign after the primaries would automatically be
assumed to be coordinated with a candidate. The language of McCain-
Feingold reflects this concern and provides that "[o]n or after the date
on which a political party nominates a candidate, no committee of the
political party may make .. . coordinated expenditure[s] [and
independent expenditures] with respect to the candidate during the
election cycle." '27 This consistent ideology is further evidence that the
Court will be receptive to this newly enacted legislation as
constitutional.
Thus, the language of Colorado Republican II indicates that the
McCain-Feingold formula for campaign finance reform will pass
constitutional muster if ever challenged in court. However, there is
still the notion that further regulation of money in the form of
campaign contributions and expenditures is flawed and violates the
basic understanding of the First Amendment rights to free speech and
political association. Emphasizing disclosure laws would empower the
voters to be the ultimate judges of corruption in politics.
V. FULL DISCLOSURE
The decision in Colorado Republican II, and the analysis used to
reach that decision, is evidence of the need to reform the federal
campaign finance law. The precedent on which Colorado Republican
Ilrests, FECA, its amendments, and the many interpretations of FECA
by the Court, is flawed. The enactment of the McCain-Feingold Bill
125. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 452.
126. Id. at 465.
127. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 213(2),
116 Stat. 81, 94 (2002).
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has essentially built on this flawed campaign finance system in its
creation of new regulations. A likely result is that weaknesses will be
found and manipulated, as has consistently occurred over the history
of campaign finance reform.' Instead of adding to the current
structure of the law, which has created the movement for change,
reform should take on its true meaning and the old law should be
discarded. A new law that is simple, manageable, and built on a strong
foundation of realism and, most importantly, the Constitution, should
be constructed in its place.
A. Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform
At the outset of its analysis, the Colorado Republican II Court
lends credence to the idea that the law of campaign finance should
remain closely tied to its constitutional base. The Court stated that,
"[s]pending for political ends and contributing to political candidates
both fall within the First Amendment's protection of speech and
political association."' 29 Thus, the Court made it clear that FECA
regulations of campaign finance are regulations of activities protected
by the Constitution. When the Court discusses the circumstances
under which the government may step in and regulate otherwise
constitutional activities, it becomes evident that such exceptions have
swallowed the First Amendment rule. It is because of these exceptions
that McCain-Feingold will most likely pass constitutional muster.
As Justice Thomas emphasizes in his dissent, restrictions on First
Amendment rights to speech and political association are subject to
strict scrutiny and are constitutional only if tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. As is clear from the past thirty
years of campaign finance law, the compelling government interest is
to eliminate corruption in politics. Indeed, the prevention of
corruption, wherever it may exist, is a worthy goal. However, as
corruption is defined by the Colorado Republican II Court, one must
wonder if FECA regulations reach beyond what is justified by the
exceptions to First Amendment freedoms. The Court explained that
corruption is understood not only as quid pro quo agreements between
contributors and candidates and undue influence on an officeholder's
judgment, but also as the appearance of such influence. ' This reflects
a belief that corruption in politics should be presumed to exist even
where there is in fact no corruption. This is not very compelling, and
128. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 39.
129. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 440 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 14-23 (1976)).
130. See id. at 466 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 441.
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preclusion of First Amendment rights for such a broadly defined
government interest should not survive under a reasonable person's
interpretation of strict scrutiny.
Even if corruption, as defined by the Court, is considered a
compelling government interest, the mechanism used to prevent such
corruption should be evaluated for its effectiveness. The Party
Expenditure Provision of FECA and McCain-Feingold both seem
inspired by the idea that money is the source of a corrupt political
system. The law limits the amount of money given as contributions to
candidates, political parties, and PACs.'32 Money spent by political
parties, PACs, and individuals in coordination with a candidate is also
limited. 33 In Colorado Republican II the Court reasoned that a
political party's efficiency in spending money for the benefit of a
specific candidate places the party in a position to be used as a means
to circumvent contribution limits that apply to individuals and
PACs. 34 The Court fears political parties may be used as conduits for
corruption.'35
The response to this corruption, real and imagined, has been to
specify random dollar amounts not to be exceeded by contributors and
parties when given to a candidate.'36 But imposing such limits in order
to prevent corruption reveals a significant gap in logic. If money in the
form of donations and coordinated expenditures is corrupting, then
limits on such money merely limits corruption. The goal of the
government should be to prevent or eradicate corruption. Following
the government's logic would mean that all contributions by
individuals and PACs and all coordinated expenditures by parties
should not just be limited but eliminated in order to rid politics of
corruption.
The result from such action would be that political parties and
PACs would cease to exist. Individuals with popularity in a
community or those with significant wealth would be the only
candidates for office. In a country where political speech and
associational rights are constitutionally protected, money must be
allowed to flow in support of such rights. Television and radio time
and newspaper and magazine space all cost money. Political money
should be earned and spent freely and should not be presumed to be
mischievous or corrupting in a capitalistic society.
132. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1).
133. See id. § 441a(d)(3).
134. 533 U.S. at 453.
135. See id. at 463-64.
136. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)-(g).
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B. Reforming Campaign Finance Laws and Respecting the
Spirit of the Constitution
Therefore, the answer is not more regulation in the form of limits
because that logic simply does not lead to the prevention of corruption
and is not consistent with the realities of our economy. The answer is
honest disclosure by candidates, parties, and other political
committees of who is giving and how much is given. This would
utilize the most important aspect of our political system-the
judgment of those citizens who exercise their right to vote. The
Buckley Court laid out the rationale for these types of disclosures more
than twenty-five years ago:
First, disclosure provides the electorate with
information "as to where political campaign money
comes from and how it is spent by the candidate" in
order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek
federal office. It allows voters to place each
candidate in the political spectrum more precisely
than is often possible solely on the basis of party
labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a
candidate's financial support also alert the voter to
the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be
responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future
performance in office.
Second, disclosure requirements deter actual
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption
by exposing large contributions and expenditures to
the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage
those who would use money for improper purposes
either before or after the election. A public armed
with information about a candidate's most generous
supporters is better able to detect any post-election
special favors that may be given in return.
And... full disclosure during an election campaign
tends "to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect
elections."'37
The constitutionality of requiring full disclosure of political
contributions and expenditures is not absolutely free from First
Amendment scrutiny. The Buckley decision, while ultimately
approving compelled disclosure of campaign finances, emphasized
that "significant encroachment on First Amendment rights of [this]
137. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
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sort... must survive exacting scrutiny."' 38 The abridgment of rights
by required disclosure survived the Court's scrutiny because it
believed that the "free functioning" of our national political system
would be enhanced by such disclosure. 39
The system needs complete and honest disclosure by every
candidate, party, and PAC, and strong punishment must follow for
failure to do so. 4 Honest disclosure would allow the free press to
seek out disclosed information and to report such information to the
public. The determination of whether or not corruption exists in the
political process would be left not to the nine justices of the Supreme
Court but to the citizens themselves.
Just as the Securities and Exchange Commission protects the
American investor, the Federal Election Commission should protect
the American voter. 4 ' SEC oversight of American stock markets
ensures that publicly traded companies accurately disclose vital
information about their finances, and the result is that investors are
given the data necessary to make a wise investment.'42 FEC oversight
of the finances of political actors, including candidates, parties, and
PACs, should serve the same purpose and empower voters to judge the
nature of certain contributions and expenditures before they invest
their final vote in a particular candidate.' 43
VI. REFORM IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The Report of the Governor's Task Force on Campaign Finance
Reform supports the notion of full disclosure by candidates and all
other entities engaged in electioneering speech or acting in
coordination with a party or candidate.'" The Task Force would
require information on all contributors giving in excess of $200 to
include the contributor's name and address, the size of the
contribution, and the occupation and employer of the contributor. 4
138. Id. at 64.
139. Id. at 66.
140. McCain-Feingold, in fact, mandates this sort of disclosure and requires a
report of all receipts and disbursements by political parties and political committees.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 103, 116 Stat. 81,
87 (2002). The bill also requires any person independently expending more than
$10,000 in a single year for electioneering communications to disclose the source of
its money. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 88-90.
141. See SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 10, at 330.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Report of the Governor's Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform, South Carolina
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All expenditures in excess of $500 would be reported as well.'
Required disclosures would be filed with the State Ethics Commission
for statewide and legislative races and would be entered into an
Internet-based system accessible to anyone.
147
Certainly, if such measures were put into place, the press and
concerned voters would have easy access to all significant
contributions and expenditures by those running for office. The
general public could easily reach conclusions as to whether undue
influence was being exerted on candidates and elected officials by any
individual or special interest donor.
Another recommendation by the Task Force is to raise current
contribution limits that were set in 1991, in light of increasing media
costs and inflationary pressure. 14  This recommendation is
accompanied by a finding that excessive money in the campaign
process creates the possibility of corruption.'49 The concern is based
on the assumption that money is itself corrupting and that, as more
money flows from a single source, that source will have an
increasingly disproportionate amount of influence compared to those
giving less or nothing at all. 5 ' As mentioned earlier in this Note, such
logic is flawed, because to do away with corruption as defined by the
U.S. Supreme Court and by this Task Force, the government would
need to eliminate all contributions.
With a system of full disclosure in place, there is no real need for
limiting contributions. For those concerned, corruption or the
appearance of corruption would be easily detected looking at lists of
donors available on the Internet. As a result of this public scrutiny,
those wishing to unduly influence a candidate with a sizeable donation
will be discouraged from doing so--a sort of laissez faire contribution
limit. Donations of support, given because a donor simply likes a
candidate's positions on the issues, would thereby be encouraged. It
should be noted that this system of full disclosure and unlimited
contributions is currently in place in Virginia.''
The Task Force further recommends that contributions should be
limited by source and amount in order to align state law with federal
law. Currently in South Carolina, contributions to candidates and
parties may come from any source,'52 whereas contributions from any
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federal elections are forbidden." 3 The Task Force would forbid
corporations and unions from contributing directly to candidates, but
would allow such contributions to political parties."5 4 The concern
with corporate and union donations is that such entities have a
comparatively greater potential to make large contributions and,
therefore, may have a greater influence on the recipient of their
donations.' This may be so, but in a system of full disclosure, such
contributions will also be much easier to detect and distinguish from
an individual donor. Therefore, disclosure is most effective against the
influences of "big tobacco", "big labor", and all other "big" special
interest groups.
The final significant recommendation of the Task Force is public
financing of campaigns for both statewide and legislative offices. 6
Under this system, qualified candidates who raise a set minimum
amount of money would be eligible to receive government funds so
long as they agree to accept and spend only the amount of money
available from public sources.' The expected result would be
elections free from undue influence caused by large private campaign
contributions.' The system would be voluntary and the publicly
funded candidate would be allowed an infusion of money from the
public election funds to at least match a privately funded candidate's
spending.5 9 The proposed source of this public election fund would
be a combination of general revenue dollars, a campaign check-off
system, and proceeds from a variety of licensing fees. 6 ' The Task
Force estimates the cost to taxpayers would be roughly $25,000,000
to cover each four-year statewide election cycle. 6'
While arguments for this type of election system are based on
notions of equality and arguments against emphasize its costly nature,
the best argument remains that full disclosure, properly enforced by
one vigilant agency-the Federal Election Commission on the federal
level and the State Ethics Commission on the state level-provides the
best method for attaining clean, efficient, and fair elections.
153. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b) (1994).
154. Report of the Governor's Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform, South Carolina
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VII. CONCLUSION
Campaign finance reformers must change their framework in
order to achieve their goals. The answer to the perceived ills of the
current systems, both federal and state, does not lie in the form of
more regulation. The courts, legislators, and commentators talk of a
corrupt system driven by money. Money may indeed be the root of all
evil, but it also makes the world go 'round, and the answer to
exorcising any evils of the campaign finance system is to let that
world work. We should let the press discover any corruption and let
citizens do it, as well, through databases on the Internet. In this
Information Age, information should be given honestly by political
actors, and the judges of their actions should be the people they seek
to represent. If full disclosure is emphasized, then, in the spirit of the
Constitution, the verdict on corruption will be handed down at the
polls.
F. Cordes Ford, IV
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